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INTRODUCTION 
Non-practicing entities ("NPEs"), pejoratively referred to as "pa-
tent trolls," are controversial. 1 A "patent troll" is commonly defined 
as an entity that licenses and enforces patents, but does not produce 
any goods. 2 Critics accuse these entities of filing frivolous suits for 
infringement of weak patents, while contributing no social benefit 
through innovation or commercialization of their technologies. 3 
1 See Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, PATENTLY-0 (Feb. 29, 2012, 10:39 
PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/09/guest-post-patent-troll-myths.html 
("Few players in the patent system (maybe none) are more hated than patent trolls."). 
2 See Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and 
the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1809, 1810 (2007) (Patent trolls are 
"firms that use their patents to extract settlements rather than license or manufacture 
technology"); see also Sannu K. Shrestha, Trolls or Market-Makers? An Empirical 
Analysis of Nonpracticing Entities, 110 CO LUM. L. REV. 114, 115 (2010) (''NPEs are 
firms that rarely or never practice their patents, instead focusing on earning licensing 
fees."). 
3 See Patent Quality Improvement: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th 
Cong. 52 (2003) (testimony of David M. Simon, Chief Patent Counsel oflntel Corpo-
ration) (noting that patent trolls purchase "improvidently granted patents from dis-
tressed companies for the sole purpose of suing legitimate businesses"); Shrestha, 
supra note 2, at 119 ("One of the most prominent criticisms against NP Es is that they 
acquire weak and obscure patents and use them to pursue 'baseless' litigation."). 
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Members of the patent community argue that these entities are a drain 
on innovation 4 and encumber productive industries. 5 
Some scholars, however, take an opposing position.6 Supporters 
of patent trolls argue that NPEs have an important role to play because 
they: (1) hold producing entities accountable for the technologies they 
employ; 7 (2) increase the liquidity of patents by acting as market-
makers; 8 and (3) enhance efficiency by specializing in valuing, licens-
ing, and enforcing patents. 9 
The NPE debate has become more than an item of academic curi-
osity-it is receiving attention from the public, the legislature, and the 
judiciary. 10 Important legislative and judicial decisions are being 
made that will have lasting and potentially profound implications for 
the integrity of the patent system and, incidentally, for the economy. 11 
James McDonough quoted the following passage from the Economist 
to demonstrate the economic moment of the patent system: 
4 See Miranda Jones, Comment, Permanent Injunction, A Remedy by Any 
Other Name Is Patently Not the Same: How Ebay v. Mercexchange Affects the Patent 
Right of Non-Practicing Entities, 14 GEO. MASON L. Rev. 1035, 1042 (2007) (com-
menting that many see ''NPEs as both opportunistic and detrimental to the advance-
ment of innovation"). 
5 See Patent Trolls: Fact or Fiction? Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. 8 (2006) (opening statement by Lamar Smith, Chairman of the Subcommittee) 
("[C]ritics assert [patent] trolls force manufacturers to divert their resources from 
productive endeavors to combat bogus infringement suits."). 
6 See, e.g., Jones, supra note 4, at 1040 (''NPEs are not a scourge of the pa-
tent system requiring a judicial cure. Rather, NPEs engage in activities useful to the 
patent system."). 
7 See id at 1044-45 ("[E]nforcement of the patent right by NPEs increases 
the cost of free-riding," and thus "force[ s] a free-rider to internalize some of the costs 
associated with copying."). 
8 James F. McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An 
Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY 
L.J. 189, 223 (2006) ("By acting as a market intermediary for patents, collecting 
information regarding patents and their associated industries, and forming relation-
ships with corporations, a patent dealer becomes a focal point for those who create 
and seek technology."). 
9 Cf ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS 13 (1806). See also infra Part III. 
10 See John R. Allison et al., Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Charac-
teristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2009) ("Patent reform 
has become, perhaps improbably, one of the most contentious issues facing Congress 
and the courts over the past six years."); see also, id at 31 ("Patent reform debates 
have, perhaps unfortunately, focused a great deal of attention on 'patent trolls.'"). 
11 The reader should be wary of any proposed solution to a perceived prob-
lem with the patent regime, "the foundation of the U.S. economy. Before radical 
changes are enacted at any level, it is imperative to ensure there really is a problem to 
fix." McDonough, supra note 8, at 197. 
THE NON-PLANTING ENTITY AND THE APPLE TREE 
In recent years intellectual property has received a lot more 
attention because ideas and innovations have become the 
most important resource, replacing land, energy and raw ma-
terials. As much as [7 5%] of the value of publicly traded 
companies in America comes from intangible assets, up from 
around 40% in the early 1980s. Alan Greenspan, former 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, recently proclaimed 
that "[t]he economic product of the United States ... has be-
come 'predominantly conceptual." Intellectual property has 
become the new economic foundation of the United States. 12 
407 
Consequently, it is important to have a balanced understanding of 
the arguments surrounding NPE behavior and to meaningfully partici-
pate in the ongoing and evolving debate. 
It is concerning that the discussion of NPEs has been rather one-
sided. 13 Save for a small body of academic literature, 14 the majority of 
material on the subject is starkly opposed to NPE behavior. 15 This is 
due, in significant part, to the efforts of large technology companies, 16 
whose interests do not necessarily align with those of small entities, 
individuals, or society in general. 17 Lobbying groups-such as the 
Coalition for Patent Fairness ("CPF") and the Business Software Alli-
12 Id. at 191-92 (quoting A Marketforldeas, ECONOMIST, Oct. 22, 2005, at 3 
(special insert)). 
13 McDonough, supra note 8, at 193 ("The general attitudes toward trolls are 
almost uniformly negative."). 
14 Id. at 197 ("Although some commentators recognize the potential value of 
trolls, their utility is mentioned merely in passing."). 
15 See id. at 196 ("Most commentators appear to side with big corporations, 
and are salivating at the chance to talk about the troll attack, portraying patent trolls as 
parasites on successful businesses and comparing them to the mold that eventually 
grows on rotten meat." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
16 Id. at 191 ("[T]here has been a concerted effort by large corporations and 
legislators, backed by the media, to put a stop to the practices of these entities pejora-
tively known as patent trolls."). 
17 Spencer Hosie, Patent Trolls and the New Tort Reform: A Practitioner's 
Perspective, 4 I/S: J.L. & PoL'Y FOR INFO. Soc'y 75, 87 (2008) ("[W]hat is good for 
these large technology companies is, in this instance at least, not good for America."). 
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ance-are well funded by large technology companies, 18 and have 
very clear agendas that include curbing the activity of NPEs. 19 
It is instructive to address the question of why many large corpo-
rations are so vehemently opposed to NPEs, 20 particularly if one en-
tertains the idea that NPEs play a useful role in society. 21 The answer 
to this question begins with an analysis of how and why the interests 
of large technology corporations differ from those of other partici-
pants in the economy. Large technology corporations use the patent 
system differently than small entities. 22 As opposed to small entities 
and startups, which obtain patents in order to deter competition and to 
present a more attractive opportunity to investors, 23 large technology 
corporations typically use patents defensively. No single company in 
an industry can own all of the patents relating to the products or ser-
vices of that industry. Competing companies build up their portfolios 
to have bargaining chips for cross-licensing negotiations; they inevi-
tably find themselves infringing (or planning to infringe) each other's 
18 The Coalition for Patent Fairness includes as members: Apple, Google, 
Intel, Microsoft, Cisco, Dell, HP, Oracle, Symantec, and others. Cade Metz, Techies 
Oppose US Patent Reform Bill, THE REGISTER (Oct. 25, 2007, 10:56 PM), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007 /10/25/techies _send _letter_ to_ senate _against_paten 
t reform bill/. 
-
19 An article by the CPF argues that patent reform legislation needs "[T]o 
minimize the impact of non-practicing entities that slow innovation and economic 
growth." HR. 1260, the Patent Reform Act: Creating Jobs and Reducing Unjustified 
Lawsuits from Non-Practicing Entities, THE COALITION FOR PATENT FAIRNESS, 
http://www.patentfaimess.org/pdf/HR _ 1260.pdf. 
20 See GREGORY D. LEIBOLD, A Brave New World: How the Recession and 
Non-Practicing Entities Have Reshaped the Licensing Marketplace and Attomey-
Client Relationships, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING STRATEGIES 130 (2011 
ed.) ("Most big businesses see NPEs as unscrupulous parasites on the patent sys-
tem."). 
21 See, Jones, supra note 4, at 1040; McDonough, supra note 8, at 223. 
22 Notably, patent strategies vary across industries as well. It is primarily 
technology companies-in the software and semiconductor industries, for example-
that are the topic of this discussion. As explained below, companies in these indus-
tries use the patent system defensively, so that competitors do not restrain them from 
producing goods. These companies stand to benefit from a weaker patent regime, 
which would make them less vulnerable to suits from outsiders (such as NPEs). Con-
trarily, the pharmaceutical industry relies heavily on patent protection. Thus, their 
interests with respect to the patent system align more closely with those of startups, 
individual inventors, and small entities. 
23 See Gary M. Lauder, Venture Capital - The Buck Stops Where?, 2 MED. 
INNOVATION & Bus. J., 14, 15 (2010) ("In most high-dollar venture investments, pa-
tents are essential to the company's and VC's ability to ensure that success will not be 
taken away by competitors who free ride on the original company's R&D."). 
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patents. 24 This "symmetry deters much patent litigation in the indus-
tries in which it operates."25 
NPEs, however, act to disturb this arrangement. Because they do 
not produce or sell any products, NPEs are not vulnerable to in-
fringement suits, nor are they interested in cross-licensing26 Thus, the 
threat of mutually assured destruction that prevents litigation between 
competitors does not deter NPEs from bringing infringement suits 
against large corporations. 27 Additionally, NPEs prevent large corpo-
rations from infringing on the patents of an individual inventor or a 
small entity-an area where corporations previously acted with impu-
nity. 28 But, unlike individual inventors and small entities, NPEs typi-
cally have the resources to enforce patents against large corpora-
tions. 29 Thus, the corporate giants are no longer immune. 
The concerted effort to abolish NPEs is, therefore, not surpris-
ing. 30 NPEs have added a potentially significant cost to doing business 
for large corporations, 31 as corporations must now internalize the cost 
24 Carl A. Kukkonen, III, The Need to Abolish Registration for Integrated 
Circuit Topographies Under Trips, 38 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 105, 135 (1997) ("Corpo-
rations often acquire patents for defensive purposes as bargaining chips in cross-
licensing negotiations."); Defensive Ammunition Against Infringement Suits, Russ 
KRArnc, http://www.krajec.com/blog/defensive-ammunition-against-infringement-
suits (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) ("Many large companies, especially in technology 
fields, use their patent portfolios in this [defensive] manner. In this strategy, a compa-
ny may amass a quantity of patents that may be used in the event of being sued by a 
competitor. In essence, the patents become bargaining chips that are played after a 
competitor sues for infringement or anything else for that matter."). 
25 Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls1, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 615 (2008); see also Krajec, supra note 24 ("The silent 
but powerful threat of a countersuit may prevent many lawsuits from even coming to 
fruition .... "). 
26 See generally LEIBOLD, supra note 20. 
27 See LEIBOLD, supra note 20, at 125 ("The prevalent theory was, of course, 
that competitors would be hesitant to sue for patent infringement if they believed that 
they would be countersued. Call it the mutual-assured-destruction theory. In recent 
years, however, the biggest threat to practicing companies has come from NPEs, 
which are not generally subject to being countersued for patent infringement."). 
28 See infra note 41 . 
29 See Shrestha, supra note 2, at 127 ("[T]he inventor is unlikely to have the 
resources to mount a serious infringement lawsuit. An NPE, however, has the capital 
and other resources to litigate .... "). 
30 See Robin M. Davis, Note, Failed Attempts to Dwarf the Patent Trolls: 
Permanent Injunctions in Patent Infringement Cases Under the Proposed Patent 
Reform Act of 2005 and Ebay v. Mercexchange, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 431, 
434 (2008) (commenting that "Congress has examined a variety of potential options 
for reducing the negative influence of patent trolls in American industry"). 
31 James Bessen, Jennifer Ford, & Michael J. Meurer, The Private and Social 
Costs of Patent Trolls, Boston University School of Law Working Paper No. 11-45, 
November 9, 2011, available at 
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of the technologies they draw upon. 32 It is frustration with this reality 
that led to lobbying groups like the CPF. 33 One commentator suggest-
ed that a more appropriate name for these groups would be "the 'Coa-
lition to Immunize Large Infringers from Pesky Patent Suits. "'34 
These lobbying groups have successfully influenced the perception of 
NPEs among the public and decision makers. 35 Some commentators 
now analogize NPEs to entities enforcing rights in real property in 
order to elucidate the apparent inconsistency in denouncing one who 
enforces intellectual property while being apathetic towards those who 
enforce real property. 36 
The remainder of this Comment will take the form of a parable. 
The purpose of this format is to build upon the analogy to the physical 
world in order to provide a more intuitive framework within which to 
conceptualize the debate surrounding NPEs. It also presents the debate 
in a form that is more accessible to those without a background in 
http://www. bu. edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/ documents/Bessen-F ord-
Meurer-no-11-45rev. pdf (finding that ''NPE lawsuits are associated with half a trillion 
dollars oflost wealth to defendants from 1990 through 2010."). 
32 David Goldman, Patent Trolls Cost Inventors Half a Trillion Dollars, 
CNNMoNEY (Mar. 1, 2012, 7:02 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2011/09/21/technology/patent_ troll_ cost/index.htm (stating a 
Boston University study showed that patent trolls ''have cost innovators $500 billion 
in lost wealth from 1990 through 2010 .... "). 
33 Cf Gene Quinn, IPW ATCHDOG, Why Patent Reform Didn't Happen in 
2 008, http ://www.ipwatchdog.com/2008/12/28/coalition-for-patent-
infringement/id= 1l60/ (last visited March 21, 2012) (The members of the CPF have a 
"single minded pursuit [that] is to weaken US patents and insulate themselves from 
ongoing patent infringement."). 
34 Hosie, supra note 17, at 77. 
35 See Id. (noting that attacks of these groups "have already been successful 
in a subtle, but important way: in shaping the way federal district court judges view 
patent cases .... ").In 2011, Congress signed into law the America Invents Act-the 
"most significant legislative event affecting patent law and practice in more than half 
a century." Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Toward A System of Invention Regis-
tration: The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. 24 (2011 ). Section 
299 of the Act states that "accused infringers may not be joined in one action as de-
fendants . . . based solely on allegations that they each have infringed the patent or 
patents in suit." 35 U.S.C. § 299 (b) (2011). This provision was meant to increase the 
cost of litigation, particularly involving NPEs, as now a patent owner must file a 
separate suit against each infringer. See Robert C. Van Arnam, The Joinder Provision 
in the Patent Reform Act: Leveling the Playing Field Against Multi-Defendant NPE 
Suits, WILLIAMS MULLEN (Sep. 15, 2011), 
http://www.williamsmullen.com/resources/detail.aspx?pub=764 ("The effect is signif-
icant in patent litigation against NPEs, as previously such plaintiffs have paid one 
filing fee to sue dozens of defendants in the same suit in the same forum."). 
36 See, e.g., McDonough, supra note 8, at 199-200 (describing the hypothet-
ical situation in which a company purchases property from an owner who lacks the 
means to enforce her rights). 
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patent law. Through the story of a man who enforces property rights 
in apple trees, the parable will address some of arguments pertaining 
to NPEs. 
Part I will demonstrate how NPEs create a market for, and in-
crease the liquidity of, patents. Part II will justify the high rents that 
NPEs can extract as compensation for undertaking the risk and ex-
pense of enforcing patents. Part III will argue that NPEs specialize in 
enforcing and licensing patents, and in doing so liberate resources that 
can be put to uses that are more productive. Part IV will address the 
argument that NPEs bring frivolous lawsuits and enforce weak pa-
tents. 
THE PARABLE OF THE NON-PLANTING ENTITY AND 
THE APPLE TREE 
A. Prelude 
A provident middle-aged man, in planning for his retirement, de-
cided to plant an apple tree on his farm. The man, known by his 
friends as Tim, was never able to afford a proper fence with which to 
surround his property, but a sign on the western border of the property 
declared that, "this land-parcel #1345 on the register-belongs to 
Tim." Tim planted his apple tree in a field some distance from his 
house, as there the soil conditions were best suited for apple trees. He 
cared for his tree until it matured and bore the finest fruit. 
One day, Tim, having been confined to a wheel chair, was making 
his way from his house to the apple tree. When the tree came into 
view, Tim saw a man who was filling a basket with apples from the 
tree. By the time Tim approached the tree, however, the man had fin-
ished picking apples and ran away. 
· The man stealing apples from Tim was Jim the Baker, who was 
using the apples as an ingredient in his famous apple crumble cake. 
Jim travels from the town ten miles north of Tim's farm, every week, 
to pick the best apples for his cake. He then sells his cakes at the town 
market. 
Jim was unaware that he was in fact stealing the apples: he as-
sumed the tree was on public land. Of course, Jim could have learned 
whether the land belonged to someone. 37 But doing so would have 
37 See Jones, supra note 4, at 1052 ("[O]ne of the most accessible strategies 
to protect against infringing on a patent is a meticulous patent clearance. Similar to a 
title clearance, a patent clearance involves a detailed search of existing claims to the 
invention that the corporation seeks to use."). 
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http://www. bu. edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/ documents/Bessen-F ord-
Meurer-no- l 1-45rev. pdf (finding that ''NPE lawsuits are associated with half a trillion 
dollars oflost wealth to defendants from 1990 through 2010."). 
32 David Goldman, Patent Trolls Cost Inventors Half a Trillion Dollars, 
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http://money.cnn.com/2011/09/21/technology/patent_ troll_ cost/index.htm (stating a 
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a century." Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Toward A System of Invention Regis-
tration: The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. 24 (2011 ). Section 
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http://www.williamsmullen.com/resources/detail.aspx?pub=764 ("The effect is signif-
icant in patent litigation against NPEs, as previously such plaintiffs have paid one 
filing fee to sue dozens of defendants in the same suit in the same forum."). 
36 See, e.g., McDonough, supra note 8, at 199-200 (describing the hypothet-
ical situation in which a company purchases property from an owner who lacks the 
means to enforce her rights). 
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Tim." Tim planted his apple tree in a field some distance from his 
house, as there the soil conditions were best suited for apple trees. He 
cared for his tree until it matured and bore the finest fruit. 
One day, Tim, having been confined to a wheel chair, was making 
his way from his house to the apple tree. When the tree came into 
view, Tim saw a man who was filling a basket with apples from the 
tree. By the time Tim approached the tree, however, the man had fin-
ished picking apples and ran away. 
The man stealing apples from Tim was Jim the Baker, who was 
using the apples as an ingredient in his famous apple crumble cake. 
Jim travels from the town ten miles north of Tim's farm, every week, 
to pick the best apples for his cake. He then sells his cakes at the town 
market. 
Jim was unaware that he was in fact stealing the apples: he as-
sumed the tree was on public land. Of course, Jim could have learned 
whether the land belonged to someone. 37 But doing so would have 
37 See Jones, supra note 4, at 1052 ("[O]ne of the most accessible strategies 
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taken time, 38 which Jim did not have. Maybe Jim was simply apathet-
ic-after all, he had been harvesting the apples for some time now 
with no consequences. Moreover, he was able to sell his cakes at a 
low price on account of the main ingredient's free availability. 
Jim first became aware that Tim claimed ownership of the apple 
tree when, while he was picking apples, Tim approached in his wheel-
chair shouting at him, "That's my apple tree. Get off my property!" 
Jim was certainly not about to allow this man, shouting at him, to 
ruin the system he had established. "This is public land," declared 
Jim, "You have no claim to this tree." He placed his basket on the 
ground, pushed Tim a distance away39, and then brought his apples 
back to town. He wasn't sure whether Tim really was the tree's right-
ful owner; he rationalized, however, that there were plenty of apples, 
and that he only picked a basket-full each week. Even if it was Tim's 
tree, there were more than enough apples for the both ofthem40• 
Jim continued about his business as usual. Tim, though frustrated, 
realized there was nothing he could do. So, Tim called the Sherriff: 
who told him that he would have to perform a title search, present 
proof of ownership of the property, and prove that Jim was getting his 
apples from Tim's tree. The property registry was located many miles 
away, in the city, and the Sherriff was in a nearby town. Tim had no 
means of transportation, and no idea how to navigate the institutions 
involved. So, Tim sat at home, wondering if another venture would 
have been more worthwhile. He thought maybe he should have taken 
up knitting. 
38 Performing a patent clearance to ensure that a product will not infringe any 
patents "can be tremendously costly and time consuming because products such as 
microprocessors and cell phones can easily be covered by dozens or even hundreds of 
different patents." Shrestha, supra note 2, at 123 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
39 Small entity or individual patent owners can be bullied into submission by 
larger corporations, who can infringe with impunity because the patent owners lack 
the financial means to enforce their patents, or will be crippled by the cost. See Jeff A. 
Ronspies, Comment, Does David Need A New Sling? Small Entities Face A Costly 
Barrier to Patent Protection, 4 J. MARSHALL REv. lNTELL. PROP. L. 184, 196 (2004) 
(conveying the story of Robert Keams, who invented the intermittent windshield 
wiper, and spent over $10 million to enforce his patent against Ford); Accord Patent 
Trolls: Fact or Fiction? Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and 
Intellectual Prop. of the H Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 52 (2006) (state-
ment of Lamar Smith) (noting that there are "bad actors who deliberately infring[ e] 
the legitimate patent rights of others."). 
40 Patents are non-rival assets-multiple parties can use them simultaneously 
without diminishing each other's enjoyment. Even so, a patent owner has the right to 
exclude others from the patent's use. E.g., McDonough, supra note 8, at 197 ('~Limit­
ing the patent holder's ability to stop the infringing activity will severely diminish the 
value of patents because the only right inherent in a patent is the right to exclude· 
others from its use.") (citing 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000)). 
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B. The Non-Planting Entity 
Robert, a businessman, frequented the town market and particu-
larly enjoyed Jim's apple crumble cake. Being a businessman, Robert 
thought the price of Jim's cake suspicious. He knew that most of the 
cake's ingredients were available wholesale at the market, and their 
prices rarely fluctuated. Robert had also overheard a conversation in 
which Jim revealed that the apples were the secret to his delicious 
cakes. Eventually, Robert's curiosity got the best of him, and he fol-
lowed Jim on an apple-picking excursion. Attempting to remain dis-
crete, Robert entered Tim's property from the west side and saw his 
sign. He walked until he could see Jim harvesting from the tree, and 
then retreated to the house that he had passed along the way. 
When Robert knocked on the door, he was greeted by Tim. Tim 
explained his predicament, which Robert pondered. It occurred to 
Robert that he was capable of taking all the steps necessary to enforce 
property rights in the tree. He had a car, and he had experience deal-
ing with the Sherriff and the property registry. "You've put a lot of 
resources into that tree," said Robert, "how about I buy it from you? 
That way you can profit from your investment, and I will try to recoup 
my investment by obtaining a fee from Jim." 
The two negotiated a price for the tree that accounted for the risk 
and cost associated with the enforcement efforts. Tim was pleased and 
relieved that he had found a way to monetize his tree; he could now 
retire in comfort. Robert invested a significant sum of money in the 
apple tree and was confronted with the difficult task of extracting val-
ue from his investment. 
PART I: THE PROPERTY REGISTRY ATTENDANT AND 
THE MAKING OF A MARKET 
Robert first traveled to the property registry to make a copy of 
Tim's title. When he arrived, he encountered a woman at the front 
desk and asked for her help. She directed him to the area containing 
the records for which he was looking. 
"But I'm curious," said the woman, "why do you need the records 
for someone else's property?" Robert explained the details of his ven-
ture to the woman-she did not look impressed. "But you contribute 
nothing to the market,"41 she said. "The tree has already been planted, 
41 It is commonly asserted that NPEs contribute nothing to the patent re-
gime's goal of fostering innovation, or indeed nothing to society. See, e.g., Daniel J. 
Mcfeely, An Argument for Restricting the Patent Rights of Those Who Misuse the 
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low price on account of the main ingredient's free availability. 
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and that he only picked a basket-full each week. Even if it was Tim's 
tree, there were more than enough apples for the both of them 40• 
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realized there was nothing he could do. So, Tim called the Sherriff, 
who told him that he would have to perform a title search, present 
proof of ownership of the property, and prove that Jim was getting his 
apples from Tim's tree. The property registry was located many miles 
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Intellectual Prop. of the H Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 52 (2006) (state-
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and cost associated with the enforcement efforts. Tim was pleased and 
relieved that he had found a way to monetize his tree; he could now 
retire in comfort. Robert invested a significant sum of money in the 
apple tree and was confronted with the difficult task of extracting val-
ue from his investment. 
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THE MAKING OF A MARKET 
Robert first traveled to the property registry to make a copy of 
Tim's title. When he arrived, he encountered a woman at the front 
desk and asked for her help. She directed him to the area containing 
the records for which he was looking. 
"But I'm curious," said the woman, "why do you need the records 
for someone else's property?" Robert explained the details of his ven-
ture to the woman-she did not look impressed. "But you contribute 
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the baker has access to a source of apples, the customers are eating 
t~eir cakes, and the man who planted the tree has enough apples for 
h~self. : our activity will increase the cost of producing apple cakes, 
which will be passed down to consumers, who will have to pay more 
for cake"42 
Robert knew this would be the result, if he was successful but he 
~id not think it unjust. "Consumers will have to pay more," he ~eplied, 
However, the price of the cakes does not presently account for the 
cost of planting and caring for the apple tree. Should the price of a 
cake not reflect the cost of all the ingredients that went into it?" 
"I suppose," conceded the woman, "but everything seems to be 
working out. Why should the customers have to pay for the apples?" 
"Things worked out on this particular occasion. However, the 
would-b~ tree planters may decide that it is not worth planting an ap-
ple tree 1f they cannot enforce their property rights in the fruit- 43 or 
they may instead decide to cultivate a plant indoors, where the ~ublic 
has no access to it, but it is also much less productive. 44 In that sense, 
U.S. Patent System to Earn Money Through Litigation, 40 ARiz. ST. L.J. 289, 304 
(~008) ("The patent troll is one example of a patent holder that enjoys the exclusive 
ng~ts afford~d by patent protection, but that adds no value that benefits society."). 
~ts contention, however, demonstrates a narrow view of the commercial world. As 
~his Comment explains, an entity may contribute in valuable ways other than produc-
mg goods or conducting research. 
42 
. . " Op~onents ofNPEs contend that the royalties they extract from producing 
entiti~s constitute a 'tax' that ultimately leads to less product development and high-
er pnces for consumers." John Johnson et al., Don't Feed the Trolls?, 42 LES 
NOUVELLES 487, 487 (2007). 
43 A 2008 study found that early-stage technology companies "sought patents 
to pre~ent technology copying (a core patent function to be sure), but also to secure 
financmg, and to enhance their reputation." Robert P. Greenspoon & Catherine M. 
Cottle, Don't Assume a Can Opener: Confronting Patent Economic Theories with 
Licensing a~~ Enforcement Reality, 12 COLUM. Sc1. & TECH. L. REV. 194, 211 (June 
2, 2011) (citmg Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the 
Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1255, 129: (2009)) http://www.stlr.org/cite.cgi?volume=l2&article=4. However, 
these funct10ns can only be served if there exists a credible threat of litigation. See 
McDonough supra note 8, at 206 ("At a minimum, there must be a credible threat of 
litig~~on to incentivize potential infringers to license the patent."). NPEs possess the 
reqms1te funds to enforc~ a pat.e~t, a~d so provide the credible threat that is necessary 
for the patent system to mcentiVIZe mnovation among smaller entities;. See Shrestha, 
supra note 2, at 129 ("[B]y rewarding inventors who otherwise would have failed to 
realiz~ any gains from their patents, NPEs could encourage further invention by both 
those mventors and other similarly-situated independent inventors which would lead 
to an increase in social welfare."). ' 
44 
The alternative to pursuing patent protection is to protect an innovation as 
a .trade secret. ~ot only ~oes trade secret protection deprive the public of a patent's 
di~~losure ~ction. but 1t also makes the risks, difficulty, and transaction costs of 
raismg capital very difficult since important information must be kept secret. See, 
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the market would suffer from a diminished supply as a result of grow-
ers' attempts to protect themselves. . . . 
"I provided the tree-farmer with another opt10~ to monetize his 
tree. I expect that my activity will incentivize potential tree-farmers to 
. k c. th " 45 invest in new trees now that they know there 1s a mar et ior em 
The woman was satisfied with this argument, and wished Robert 
good luck. Robert breathed a sigh of relief, having determined ~hat the 
property did in fact belong to Tim. He proceeded to the pohce de-
partment to engage the SheriffSheriff. 
PART II: THE SHERIFF AND THE PRICE OF RISK 
A. Compensation for a Risky Investment 
Upon his arrival, Robert described the apple tree affair to the 
Sheriff, and explained that he wanted to be compen~ated for the ap-
ples Jim had stolen in the past. The Sheriff thought this to be reasona-
ble on the condition that Robert could prove Jim's cakes were made 
us~g his apples. Additionally, the Sheriff assured Robert that Jim 
would be imprisoned in the event that Jim stole any more appl~s-:--a 
threat that would afford Robert significant leverage when negotiatmg 
a price for the apples. 
The Sheriff was concerned, however, that Robert may take ad-
vantage of his now superior bargaining position; the Sheri~f was also. a 
patron of Jim's bakery. "How will you determine the pnce you will 
demand from Jim?" asked the Sheriff. 
"I expect that I will negotiate for the highest price I ca~ attain~" 
Robert answered. "I have taken on significant risk in pursmt of this 
e.g., Incase, Inc. v. Timex Corp., 488 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2007); Tax Track S~ste~s 
Corp. v. New Investor World, Inc., 478 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2007): A func~iomng 
patent system "negates the natural incentive to conceal profi~able mforma~ion by 
creating an incentive to disclose through the grant. of the pate~t 1:-g?t ... [ a~d] m~uce~ 
an inventor to incur the financial risks involved m commercrnltzmg [an] mvention. 
Jones supra note 4, at 1044. . . 
' 45 See Shrestha, supra note 2, at 129-30 ("It is important.to keep i~ mmd, 
however, that by rewarding inventors who otherwise w?uld h~ve failed to realt~e any 
gains from their patents, NPEs could encourage further mven:10n by both those mv~n­
tors and other similarly-situated independent inventors, which would lead to ~n 1~­
crease in social welfare. This latter effect could balance or surpass any reduct10n m 
social welfare that results from enforcement of dormant patents."). Additionally: a 
well-functioning market for patents is essential for early-stage technology com~am~s 
to raise capital. See Greenspoon & Cottle, supra note 43, at 215 ("By enhancmg lt-
quidity in technology markets, NPEs create the very conditions that enable venture 
capital to support start-up companies."). 
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Robert knew this would be the result, if he was successful, but he 
did not think it unjust. "Consumers will have to pay more," he replied 
"However, the price of the cakes does not presently account for th~ 
cost of planting and caring for the apple tree. Should the price of a 
cake not reflect the cost of all the ingredients that went into it?" 
"I suppose," conceded the woman, "but everything seems to be 
working out. Why should the customers have to pay for the apples?" 
"Things worked out on this particular occasion. However, the 
would-b~ tree planters may decide that it is not worth planting an ap-
ple tree 1f they cannot enforce their property rights in the fruit; 43 or 
they may instead decide to cultivate a plant indoors, where the public 
has no access to it, but it is also much less productive. 44 In that sense, 
U.S. Patent System to Earn Money Through Litigation, 40 ARrz. ST. L.J. 289, 304 
(~008) ("The patent troll is one example of a patent holder that enjoys the exclusive 
ng~ts afford~d by patent protection, but that adds no value that benefits society."). 
This content10n, however, demonstrates a narrow view of the commercial world. As 
this Comment explains, an entity may contribute in valuable ways other than produc-
ing goods or conducting research. 
• • ~2 Op~onent~ of.NPEs c~ntend that the royalties they extract from producing 
entlti~s constitute a tax that ultimately leads to less product development and high-
er pnces for consumers." John Johnson et al., Don't Feed the Trolls?, 42 LES 
NOUVELLES 487, 487 (2007). 
43 A 2008 study found that early-stage technology companies "sought patents 
to pre~ent technology copying (a core patent function to be sure), but also to secure 
financmg, and to enhance their reputation." Robert P. Greenspoon & Catherine M. 
Cottle, Don't Assume a Can Opener: Confronting Patent Economic Theories with 
Licensing a~~ Enforcement Reality, 12 COLUM. Sc1. & TECH. L. REv. 194, 211 (June 
2, 2011) (c1tmg Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the 
Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1255, 1299 (2009)) http://www.stlr.org/cite.cgi?volume=12&article=4. However 
these functions can only be served if there exists a credible threat of litigation. Se; 
McDonough supra note 8, at 206 ("At a minimum, there must be a credible threat of 
litig~ti.on to incentivize potential infringers to license the patent."). NPEs possess the 
reqms1te funds to enforce a patent, and so provide the credible threat that is necessary 
for the patent system to incentivize innovation among smaller entities;. See Shrestha, 
supra note 2, at 129 ("[B]y rewarding inventors who otherwise would have failed to 
realiz~ any gains from their patents, NPEs could encourage further invention by both 
those mventors and other similarly-situated independent inventors, which would lead 
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The alternative to pursuing patent protection is to protect an innovation as 
a_trade secret. ~ot only ~oes trade secret protection deprive the public of a patent's 
d1~c_losure ~ct10n. b~t 1t also makes the risks, difficulty, and transaction costs of 
ra1smg capital very difficult since important information must be kept secret. See, 
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the market would suffer from a diminished supply as a result of grow-
ers' attempts to protect themselves. 
"I provided the tree-farmer with another option to monetize his 
tree. I expect that my activity will incentivize potential tree-farmers to 
invest in new trees now that they know there is a market for them"45 
The woman was satisfied with this argument, and wished Robert 
good luck. Robert breathed a sigh of relief, having determined ~hat the 
property did in fact belong to Tim. He proceeded to the pohce de-
partment to engage the SheriffSheriff. 
PART II: THE SHERIFF AND THE PRICE OF RISK 
A. Compensation for a Risky Investment 
Upon his arrival, Robert described the apple tree affair to the 
Sheriff, and explained that he wanted to be compensated for the ap-
ples Jim had stolen in the past. The Sheriff thought this to be reasona-
ble on the condition that Robert could prove Jim's cakes were made 
us~g his apples. Additionally, the Sheriff assured Robert that Jim 
would be imprisoned in the event that Jim stole any more appl~s~a 
threat that would afford Robert significant leverage when negotiatmg 
a price for the apples. 
The Sheriff was concerned, however, that Robert may take ad-
vantage of his now superior bargaining position;_ the Sheri~was also_ a 
patron of Jim's bakery. "How will you determme the pnce you will 
demand from Jim?" asked the Sheriff. 
"I expect that I will negotiate for the highest price I ca~ attain~" 
Robert answered. "I have taken on significant risk in pursmt of this 
e.g., Incase, Inc. v. Timex Corp., 488 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2007); Tax Track Systems 
Corp. v. New Investor World, Inc., 478 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2007): A func~ioning 
patent system "negates the natural incentive to conceal profi~able mforma~10n by 
creating an incentive to disclose through the grant_ of the pate~t i:g?t ... [ a~d] m~uce~ 
an inventor to incur the financial risks involved m commercrnhzmg [an] mvent1on. 
Jones, supra note 4, at 1044. . . 
45 See Shrestha, supra note 2, at 129-30 ("It is important to keep m mmd, 
however, that by rewarding inventors who otherwise w?uld h~ve failed to reali~e any 
gains from their patents, NPEs could encourag~ further mven~10n by both those mv~n­
tors and other similarly-situated independent mventors, which would lead to ~n n:-
crease in social welfare. This latter effect could balance or surpass any reduct10n m 
social welfare that results from enforcement of dormant patents."). Additionally, a 
well-functioning market for patents is essential for early-stage technology compani~s 
to raise capital. See Greenspoon & Cottle, supra note 43, ~t. 215 ("By enhancing li-
quidity in technology markets, NPEs create the very conditions that enable venture 
capital to support start-up companies."). 
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venture, and the potential pay-out must be high to make my expendi-
tures worthwhile." 
The Sheriff was still uncomfortable with the situation. "Yes, I 
suppose from your perspective it is reasonable to seek the highest 
price. But if I prevent Jim from using apples from your tree, he will be 
forced to stop baking apple cakes, or expend considerable effort to 
find a new source of apples. This will give you leverage to extract a 
greater-than-market price for apples that Jim buys from you. Your 
opportunistic behavior will increase the cost of apple cakes without 
providing any social benefit. "46 
"What I am doing is socially beneficial," explained Robert. "You 
mustn't restrict your analysis to a particular segment of the market-
place." Robert recounted the discussion with the woman at the proper-
ty registry. "If you accept that we need individuals who plant and care 
for fruit-bearing trees, it follows that those individuals must have a 
way to protect their rights. But enforcement comes only at a cost-a 
cost that will be borne, at least in part, by consumers." 
"Without tree-growers," added the Sheriff, "we couldn't have ap-
ple cakes. So your activity will force the market to internalize all of 
the costs that go into producing apple cakes."47 
"That's correct," Robert approved. "And part of that cost is the 
risk associated with enforcing property rights." 
The Sheriff chimed in, "You need a potentially high return on 
your investment for the same reason that a venture capitalist requires 
the prospect of a high return: you both need the possibility of a great 
reward to incentivize your investment in a risky venture."48 
46 Cf Hosie, supra note 17, at 81 ("Getting an injunction on behalf of a per-
ceived troll on a minor feature incorporated into an important software product is 
somewhat like trying to teach a dodo to fly: the bird was flightless and is now extinct. 
It just will not happen. Given all the hysteria about injunctive relief and consequent 
settlement leverage, how often has a court actually entered an injunction on behalf of 
a perceived troll to shut down an ongoing business? I know of no case, though per-
haps the now-notorious RlM case came closest (injunction threatened but not in 
place). One case out of thousands hardly constitutes a litigation crisis."). 
47 See Greenspoon & Cottle, supra note 43 , at 215 ("Even where their suc-
cess in patent enforcement might lead a licensee to raise prices, the pre-license price 
might have been sub-competitive, since it did not incorporate the true costs of inputs 
before the license fee was paid."); see also Jones, supra note 4, at 1045 ("By seeking 
out free-riders and enforcing the patent right against them, NPEs force a free-rider to 
internalize some of the costs associated with copying."). 
48 NPEs must seek high returns in order to account for the high cost and 
uncertainty inherent in patent litigation. See Johnson et al., supra note 42 , at 490 
(comparing the approaches taken by NPEs and venture capitalists, and noting that 
"[f]rom the point of view of the troll, one significant 'win' will more than pay for a 
large number. of misses"). 
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With that, Robert left to prepare the evidence he needed to show 
that Jim was stealing his apples. He set up a video camera by the tree, 
collected footprints and fingerprints, and interviewed some of Jim's 
employees at the bakery. He returned to the Sheriff with all of this, 
which the Sheriff considered sufficient. 
B. Holdup 
The following morning, Robert and the Sheriff traveled to the 
market, where Jim was selling his goods. The Sheriff disbanded the 
long line-up of customers waiting to purchase apple-cakes. Predicta-
bly, Jim was irate and demanded an explanation. The Sheriff ex-
plained to him that Jim had wrongfully appropriated the apples he 
used in his cakes, and that he was enjoined from selling more cakes 
until he and Robert could agree on a price to be paid for the apples. 
Angry though Jim was, he wanted to continue selling his cakes. 
The price of apples was typically just under $1 per pound, so Jim of-
fered to pay Robert a fair price of $1 per pound for his apples. Robert 
refused this offer, and demanded $2 per pound. 49 
Jim sat down and pondered the situation. At $2 per pound of ap-
ples, he would still tum a profit-though he would probably have to 
raise the price of his cakes-and it would almost certainly cost him 
more to find a new source of quality apples. 50 The apples from Rob-
ert's tree were the secret to Jim's cakes. Jim doubted whether it would 
even be possible to find comparable apples. 51 But $2 for a pound of 
apples was unprecedented; no one would pay so much, even for excel-
lent apples. If not for the Sheriff's decree, Jim would not even consid-
er paying such a high price. 
49 See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 
85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 1993 (2007) ("[T]he threat of an injunction can enable a patent 
holder to negotiate royalties far in excess of the patent holder's true economic contri-
bution."). Justice Kennedy expressed this view, concurring with the eBay Inc. v. Mer-
cExchange, L.L. C. decision: 
An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and 
selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees. For these firms, an 
injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be 
employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy 
licenses to practice the patent. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 
(2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
50 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 49 at 2008 ("[I]t is not the underlying 
value of the patented technology, but the cost to the defendant of switching technolo-
gies midstream, that is driving the high royalties being paid."). 
51 Shrestha, supra note 2, at 123 ("NPEs may be demanding the seemingly 
high licensing fees because they own the foundational patents that made the products 
possible in the first place."). 
416 JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & INTERNET [Vol. 3 :2] 
venture, and the potential pay-out must be high to make my expendi-
tures worthwhile." 
The Sheriff was still uncomfortable with the situation. "Yes, I 
suppose from your perspective it is reasonable to seek the highest 
price. But if I prevent Jim from using apples from your tree, he will be 
forced to stop baking apple cakes, or expend considerable effort to 
find a new source of apples. This will give you leverage to extract a 
greater-than-market price for apples that Jim buys from you. Your 
opportunistic behavior will increase the cost of apple cakes without 
providing any social benefit. "46 
"What I am doing is socially beneficial," explained Robert. "You 
mustn't restrict your analysis to a particular segment of the market-
place." Robert recounted the discussion with the woman at the proper-
ty registry. "If you accept that we need individuals who plant and care 
for fruit-bearing trees, it follows that those individuals must have a 
way to protect their rights. But enforcement comes only at a cost-a 
cost that will be borne, at least in part, by consumers." 
"Without tree-growers," added the Sheriff, "we couldn't have ap-
ple cakes. So your activity will force the market to internalize all of 
the costs that go into producing apple cakes."47 
"That's correct," Robert approved. "And part of that cost is the 
risk associated with enforcing property rights." 
The Sheriff chimed in, "You need a potentially high return on 
your investment for the same reason that a venture capitalist requires 
the prospect of a high return: you both need the possibility of a great 
reward to incentivize your investment in a risky venture."48 
46 Cf Hosie, supra note 17, at 81 ("Getting an injunction on behalf of a per-
ceived troll on a minor feature incorporated into an important software product is 
somewhat like trying to teach a dodo to fly: the bird was flightless and is now extinct. 
It just will not happen. Given all the hysteria about injunctive relief and consequent 
settlement leverage, how often has a court actually entered an injunction on behalf of 
a perceived troll to shut down an ongoing business? I know of no case, though per-
haps the now-notorious RIM case came closest (injunction threatened but not in 
place). One case out of thousands hardly constitutes a litigation crisis."). 
47 See Greenspoon & Cottle, supra note 43 , at 215 ("Even where their suc-
cess in patent enforcement might lead a licensee to raise prices, the pre-license price 
might have been sub-competitive, since it did not incorporate the true costs of inputs 
before the license fee was paid."); see also Jones, supra note 4, at 1045 ("By seeking 
out free-riders and enforcing the patent right against them, NPEs force a free-rider to 
internalize some of the costs associated with copying."). 
48 NPEs must seek high returns in order to account for the high cost and 
uncertainty inherent in patent litigation. See Johnson et al., supra note 42 , at 490 
(comparing the approaches taken by NPEs and venture capitalists, and noting that 
"[ f]rom the point of view of the troll, one significant 'win' will more than pay for a 
large number. of misses"). 
THE NON-PLANTING ENTITY AND THE APPLE TREE 417 
With that, Robert left to prepare the evidence he needed to show 
that Jim was stealing his apples. He set up a video camera by the tree, 
collected footprints and fingerprints, and interviewed some of Jim's 
employees at the bakery. He returned to the Sheriff with all of this, 
which the Sheriff considered sufficient. 
B. Holdup 
The following morning, Robert and the Sheriff traveled to the 
market, where Jim was selling his goods. The Sheriff disbanded the 
long line-up of customers waiting to purchase apple-cakes. Predicta-
bly, Jim was irate and demanded an explanation. The Sheriff ex-
plained to him that Jim had wrongfully appropriated the apples he 
used in his cakes, and that he was enjoined from selling more cakes 
until he and Robert could agree on a price to be paid for the apples. 
Angry though Jim was, he wanted to continue selling his cakes. 
The price of apples was typically just under $1 per pound, so Jim of-
fered to pay Robert a fair price of $1 per pound for his apples. Robert 
refused this offer, and demanded $2 per pound. 49 
Jim sat down and pondered the situation. At $2 per pound of ap-
ples, he would still tum a profit-though he would probably have to 
raise the price of his cakes-and it would almost certainly cost him 
more to find a new source of quality apples. 50 The apples from Rob-
ert's tree were the secret to Jim's cakes. Jim doubted whether it would 
even be possible to find comparable apples. 51 But $2 for a pound of 
apples was unprecedented; no one would pay so much, even for excel-
lent apples. If not for the Sheriffs decree, Jim would not even consid-
er paying such a high price. 
49 See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 
85 TEX. L. REv. 1991, 1993 (2007) ("[T]he threat of an injunction can enable a patent 
holder to negotiate royalties far in excess of the patent holder's true economic contri-
bution."). Justice Kennedy expressed this view, concurring with the eBay Inc. v. Mer-
cExchange, L.L. C. decision: 
An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and 
selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees. For these firms, an 
injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be 
employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy 
licenses to practice the patent. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 
(2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
50 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 49 at 2008 ("[I]t is not the underlying 
value of the patented technology, but the cost to the defendant of switching technolo-
gies midstream, that is driving the high royalties being paid."). 
51 Shrestha, supra note 2, at 123 ("NPEs may be demanding the seemingly 
high licensing fees because they own the foundational patents that made the products 
possible in the first place."). 
418 JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & INTERNET [Vol. 3 :2] 
Jim's frustration got the better of him. "This is extortion!"52 he 
yelled at the Sheriff. "Why not just force Robert to accept a reasona-
ble price?"53 
"The tree is my property!" exclaimed Robert. "Sheriff, you would 
diminish the value of my property by denying me the basic right to 
exclude others from its use?"54 
This was the scenario that the Sheriff had feared. Was this the 
right way to handle the dispute?55 The Sheriff pondered the situation, 
attempting see the bigger picture. On one hand, Robert's holdup price 
would raise the price of apple cakes-ostensibly a deadweight loss. 
Likewise, the ability of tree-farmers to extract holdup prices may be a 
disincentive for bakers to produce new baked goods. 56 On the other 
hand, the work of tree farmers is valuable. 57 As Robert had argued 
52 NPEs have been accused of "engaging in nothing more than legalized 
extortion." McDonough, supra note 8, at 196-97 (quoting Bernard Stamler, Battles of 
the Patents, Like David v. Goliath, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at G2). 
53 Holdup is enabled by the threat of injunctive relief Thomas F. Cotter, 
Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151, 1171 
(2009) ("Absent the threat of injunctive relief, there would not appear to be a holdup 
problem, since the defendant (by hypothesis) could simply use the patent and pay 
court-ordered damages."). 
54 McDonough, supra note 8, at 197 ("Limiting the patent holder's ability to 
stop the infringing activity will severely diminish the value of patents because the 
only right inherent in a patent is the right to exclude others from its use.") (citing 35 
U.S.C. § 261 (2000)). 
55 In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), the Supreme 
Court was confronted with the question of under what circumstances a court should 
issue an injunction on behalf of a patentee. The Court rejected the Federal Circuit's 
categorical rule "'that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validi-
ty have been adjudged."' Id. at 393-94 (citing 401 F.3d 1323, 1338). Before an in-
junction can be granted, "[a] plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an 
irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are 
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hard-
ships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) 
that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction." 547 U.S. 
at 391. Although the four-factor test clearly reduces the availability of injunctive 
relief, there is disagreement with respect to how the Ebay decision will affect NPEs. 
See Cotter, supra note 53, at 1174 ("[C]ommentators have struggled to define precise-
ly when injunctive relief is appropriate, with some taking the view that injunctive 
relief is rarely advisable when the plaintiff is a nonmanufacturing patent owner, and 
others reading the eBay decision more narrowly."). 
56 Shrestha points out that arguments against NPEs, relating to the effect of 
their activity on downstream prices, "simply [echo] arguments against the patent 
system as a whole. The U.S. patent system seeks to reward inventors by providing 
them with a monopoly over their invention for a limited time. Therefore, patents 
typically have all the efficiency-reducing characteristics of monopolies." Shrestha, 
supra note 2, at 121-22. 
57 The question of whether to allow patentees an injunctive remedy has been 
framed as a problem of balancing upstream and downstream incentives. See Cotter, 
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previously, tree-farmers must be confident that their rights can be 
protected in order to incentivize investment in new trees. 58 Moreover, 
the Sheriff remembered, the increased price of apple-cakes does not 
only represent a deadweight loss; it represents the cost of enforce-
ment. 59 Those who undertake to enforce the property rights of tree-
farmers must be compensated for the risk inherent in their business. 
Jim interrupted the Sheriffs thoughts. "What if others choose to 
take advantage of your injunction policy? Next, I'll be enjoined from 
selling my cakes because someone claims a property right in the eggs 
or the flour that I am using. 60 These individuals will all seek a profit-
maximizing price for my use of their goods, which will be above mar-
ket price because of their enhanced bargaining power. Eventually, the 
cost of ingredients will exceed the value of a cake, and I will be 
forced to stop baking."61 
"Such an outcome is unlikely," retorted Robert. "Rational actors 
who wish to realize a profit have no incentive to halt the production of 
goods that might otherwise be a source of revenue. Should the parties 
reach an impasse, property owners would be strongly encouraged to 
lower their prices individually, or collaborate to collectively charge a 
practicable price. A party stands to profit from purchasing all of the 
assets, only if it charges a price at which production can continue." 
The Sheriff decided not to lift the injunction, and the parties 
agreed to the price of $2/pound of apples. 
Robert returned home to fill in the balance sheet for the venture. 
Not surprisingly, Robert found that he did not do all that well. De-
supra note 53 , at 1168 ("If there is reason to believe that allowing patentees to ex-
tract holdup-induced rents generates more social harm, in terms of both static 
deadweight losses and disincentives on the part of downstream users to invest in the 
application of new technologies, than social benefits in the form of incentives directed 
towards upstream innovators, then courts may be well-advised to take steps to miti-
gate holdup .... "). 
58 See Paul R. Michel, Fellow Citizens: Be On Guard, J. PATENT AND 
TRADEMARK OFFICE Soc'Y, April 2010, http://www.jptos.org/chief-judge-paul-
michel-speech.html ("Patents, and the protection of investment they afford, provide 
the only incentives strong enough to cause increased private investment in research-
based companies."). 
59 Those who argue that high rents (that is, greater than would be available 
absent the threat of injunctive relief) on the part of an NPE constitutes deadweight 
loss, fail to take account of the utility and cost of enforcing patents. If one accepts that 
NPE activity has value, this "deadweight loss" is really compensation for the NPEs 
contribution. 
60 The circumstance in which a product is covered by multiple patents is 
termed "royalty stacking." See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 49, at 1993. 
61 Lemley and Shapiro contend that the combination of royalty stacking and 
holdup "can even lead to circumstances in which no one can profitably produce a 
product with social value." Id. at 2010. 
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pending on how long Jim's extant sales continued, Robert determined 
that he would likely lose money. 62 However, Robert was not easily 
discouraged. He did successfully enforce his property rights in the 
tree, and was convinced that there was money to be made. 
PART ill: THE MAKINGS OF A SPECIALIST 
Having succeeded with his first venture, Robert decided to seek 
out similar opportunities. But, he was not sure how to go about his 
search. Somehow he would have to discern which fruit trees were 
subject to theft, or at least were likely to be pilfered. But he would 
also need to fmd tree-owners who were in need of his services-
presumably those who lacked the means and resources to enforce their 
rights themselves. This was all very daunting to Robert, so he consult-
ed with Christina, a past business partner, for advice. 
When Robert arrived at Christina's house, she was in the process 
of cooking dinner. Robert sat in the living room while she fmished 
with the last preparations. He noticed Adam Smith's "Wealth of Na-
tions" on the coffee table, and began flipping through it as he waited. 
Christina entered the room. "I've been brushing up on some eco-
nomic theory ~uring my spare time," she explained. 
Robert described his enforcement venture, and explained the chal-
lenge he faced if he were to pursue the business further. The two first 
discussed the problem of identifying valuable trees from which people 
may be likely to steal. Although they identified a number of metrics to 
predict tree value, they determined that to make such a prediction ac-
curately would necessitate significant expertise. Robert would have to 
learn not only to recognize the indicia of a valuable tree, but also to 
survey the market place and keep track of products incorporating 
fruits that might have been stolen from trees that he is enforcing. Ad-
ditionally, Robert learned from his previous venture that enforcing 
property rights is very expensive. Only a highly valuable tree, whose 
62 Contrary to what some believe, for example, NPE business models are 
difficult to operate profitably. Some have performed very well, although this is hardly 
a reliable outcome. See, e.g., McDonough, supra note 8, at 196 (commentator accused 
NPEs of "manipulat[ing] the patent system for large profits") (quoting Roy Mark, 
Tech Wants Patent 'Trolls' Tamed, INTERNETNEWSCOM , Apr. 26, 2005, 
http://www.intemetnews.com/bus-news/article.php/3500546); See also Hosie, supra 
note 17, at 83-84 ("After paying the lawyers and the inventors (often on a royalty 
revenue share basis), there just is not much left for this troll. Over the five year period 
2002-06, Acacia Technologies Group lost close to $35 million. This is hardly a 'very, 
very profitable business model."' (internal citations omitted)). 
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fruits are being used to make a commercially successful product, will 
warrant enforcement. 63 
"Once you have garnered this expertise," Christina postulated, 
"you needn't concern yourself with the abilities of the tree-owners." 
"But I do. Why would someone need my services if she had the 
means to enforce her property rights herself?" asked Robert. 
Christina pointed to the book on the table. "Because specialization 
promotes efficiency," she said, as she retired to the kitchen and re-
turned with two plates of chicken casserole. "Consider this casserole. I 
might have raised the chicken myself, grown the vegetables, and 
milled wheat into flour, but I know nothing of those activities. I would 
have had to spend significant time learning the necessary skills and 
making mistakes. Instead, I run a business; that is what I am good at. I 
take the money I make from my work and purchase the ingredients I 
need from specialists who produce them. By specializing and develop-
ing expertise, we save time and produce more efficiently. 
"Adam Smith recognized this when he discussed the division of 
labor. He reasoned that one who is focused on a particular line of 
work is better able to discover more efficient methods of performing 
that work. By contrast, one who spreads her attention across multiple 
endeavors cannot spend enough time analyzing any one of them to 
c. . . 64 per.iect its practice. 
"Someone who plants and grows fruit trees commands expertise 
in tree farming; her time is best spent using that expertise by caring 
for trees. Any time she spends pursuing activities outside of her exper-
tise-enforcing property rights, for example-will not be nearly as 
d . d ·11 " 65 pro uctive, an w1 waste resources. 
63 See Shrestha, supra note 2, at 128 ("NPEs can therefore perform an im-
portant function by sifting through the patents owned by independent inventors and 
identifying the most valuable ones. By repeatedly analyzing and buying patents, 
NPEs become experts at differentiating between valuable and trivial patents and re-
warding the inventors accordingly."). 
64 See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS 13 (1806) ("Men are much more likely to discover easier and 
readier methods of attaining any object, when the whole attention of their minds is 
directed towards that single object, than when it is dissipated among a great variety of 
things. But in consequence of the division oflabour, the whole of every man's atten-
tion comes naturally to be directed towards some one very simple object."). 
65 See Marc Morgan, Comment, Stop Looking Under the Bridge for Imagi-
nary Creatures: A Comment Examining Who Really Deserves the Title Patent Troll, 
17 FED. CIR. B.J. 165, 173-74 (2008) ("Inventors maximize efficiency by focusing on 
inventing and allowing other parties to deal with enforcement or licensing of patents. 
Indeed, many inventors find enforcement or licensing of patents to be distracting, 
time consuming, and costly."); see also Shrestha, supra note 2, at 128 ("By selling the 
rights to their invention, the inventors could focus their attention and resources on the 
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"That's it!" exclaimed Robert, "My expertise will allow me to en-
force property rights more efficiently and at a lesser expense than a 
tree farmer, who could contract me to enforce her rights at a lower 
cost than she could do it herself."66 
"F~hermore," ~dded Christina, "tree farmers have not developed 
e:x-pert1se at e_valuatmg trees for the purposes of enforcing property 
nghts, or puttmg together deals with potential buyers. You will make 
the tree-farming industry more efficient by relieving them of these 
tasks. 67 Large entities, like apple orchards, c~uld also benefit from 
Y_Our services .. Even though they can afford to enforce their property 
nghts, they will benefit from your expertise. "68 
PART IV: FRIVOLOUS CLAIMS AND QUESTIONABLE 
RIGHTS 
Years passed, and Robert's success earned him some notoriety. 
Tree farmers without the means to enforce their property rights knew 
that Robert would purchase their trees from them in the event their 
property rights were being infringed. Orchards and other large grow-
ing operations outsourced the enforcement of their property rights to 
Robert, which liberated resources that were now being put to more 
productive uses. 
Robert's reputation, however, was hardly untarnished. Bakers, 
grocers, restaurant owners, and other businesses for which fruit is a 
raw material were becoming increasingly frustrated. They had not 
previously had to concern themselves with the propriety of their 
fru. ' 69 1t s source. As well, many began accusing Robert of enforcing 
questionable property rights. It was said that his targets would give in 
~o his demands in order to avoid the expense of denying them~ven 
1f they thought Robert's claims against them were weak. 
pursuit of inventive activity instead of spending time and energy on trying to com-
mercialize their invention." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
66 Jones, supra note 4, at 1036 ("[The] transaction between inventor and NPE 
can be viewed as a division of cooperative labor, allowing each entity to do what it 
does bes
6
t7 whether that is inve~ting or enforcing patent rights."). Allen W. Wang, Rzse of the Patent Intermediaries, 25 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 159, 164 (2010) ("[I]t is a rare company ... that has any clue whatsoever about 
how to value, analyze, and structure ... iP asset transfers." (internal quotations omit-
ted)). 
68 .~ Navigation Group is an example of an NPE that specializes in enforcing 
and monetizmg the patents for other companies, often companies whose enforcement 
efforts have been "disappointing and ... expensive experiences .... " We Monetize 
Patents, IP NAVIGATION GROUP, http://ipnav.com/Our-Solutions/solutions (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2012). 
69 See supra note 40 . 
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Robert was at one of his client's apple orchards, evaluating the 
trees, when an employee approached him. "You're the property en-
forcer that we hired, aren't you?" asked the employee. "I hear you 
make your money by exploiting the system to enforce property rights 
of questionable validity. People enter into early settlements with you 
because it costs them less than defending against your claims." 
Robert had heard these accusations before, and it bothered him-
this was not a strategy he employed .. "That is not how I operate," re-
plied Robert. "I spend considerable time analyzing trees to determine 
which ones are worth enforcing. I consider not only the value of the 
tree and whether its fruit is being put to use, but also whether its own-
er has a valid property right." 
"Why does it matter that the property right is valid if your targets 
will settle with you regardless?" questioned the employee. 
"They won't simply settle with me regardless of validity. 70 It may 
cost less to settle than to defend against a given claim, but a policy of 
settling only reinforces the strategy of enforcing questionable rights. 
Having a reputation for settling weak claims will be more costly in the 
long run. A business with such a reputation will establish itself as an 
easy target, drawing a potential flood of enforcement actions."71 
"That shouldn't prevent you from making the claim," said the 
employee. "The more enforcement actions you initiate, the more op-
portunities you have for settlements or wins." 
Robert replied, "Enforcing property rights is very expensive. 72 I 
only initiate an enforcement action if I am confident that the right I 
70 See Wang, supra note 67, at 178-79 ("[C]ompanies have started to c~n­
sider their patent portfolios with more care and devote more resources to defendmg 
their right to conduct business activities."); see also Shrestha, supra note 2, at 120 
(quoting Jay Monaham, the deputy general counsel of eBay, sayin~ that eBay's _ap-
proach to NPE suits "has been t~, vigorously defend ourselves agamst these claims 
and not to pay ransom money .... ). 
71 See ,Hosie, supra note 17 , at 79-80 ("Smart companies, particularly those 
frequently sued, do not settle frivolous cases. While doing so might save mon~y 
against defense costs in one case, the cost of being seen as a soft sett:lement to~ch will 
be brutally expensive across the entire litigation portfolio, reachmg ever mto the 
future."). . . 
72 A 2011 survey by the American Intellectual Property Association found 
that the median cost of a patent infringement suit with less than $1 million at risk was 
$650,000; with $25 million at risk, the median cost was $5 million. American Intel-
lectual Property Association, Report of the Economic Survey 2011 (July 2011); see 
also ,Hosie, supra note 17, at 80 ("The cost of building and trying a patent case can 
easily exceed $4 million."). 
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am enforcing is valid. 73 Of course there will always be uncertainty, 
but I simply cannot afford to initiate frivolous claims." 
The employee went on his way, having been convinced by Rob-
ert's explanation. Robert finished evaluating the trees in the orchard 
with no further confrontations. The employee, however, was not the 
only person that had approached Robert to offer a criticism of his 
work. It occurred to Robert that he might be better off enforcing intel-
lectual property rights instead. 
CONCLUSION 
NPEs play an important role in an idea economy, the structure of 
which promotes inequalities among participants. By creating a market 
for patents and posing a credible threat of litigation, NPEs enable 
small entities, startups, and individual inventors to participate in and 
benefit from the patent regime. Additionally, NPEs command valua-
ble and scarce expertise in patent licensing and enforcement. By spe-
cializing in these activities, NPEs permit inventors and manufacturers 
to more efficiently allocate resources, and focus on their respective 
specialties. This Comment argues, moreover, that higher rent extract-
ed by NPEs is necessary to compensate them for the uncertainty and 
cost of enforcing patents. Thus, the cost that NPEs impose on produc-
tive industries and, concomitantly on consumers, does not represent a 
deadweight loss. On the contrary, it is the cost of operating a patent 
system that tailors to the needs of small entities, startups, individual 
inventors, and venture capitalists-integral participants in the econo-
my. This Comment also refutes the assertion that NPEs routinely en-
73 See Shrestha, supra note 2, at 120 ("Given the enormous cost of litigating 
infringement suits, it is doubtful whether a rational NPE, or a contingency fee attor-
ney, would sue a defendant if there was a low probability of a positive outcome."); 
Jones, supra note 4, at 1046--47 (''NPEs face tough choices in enforcing patents, and 
will not likely do so if they hold a weak patent that is most likely invalid."); ,Hosie, 
supra note 17, at 80 (''No sane plaintiffs lawyer would spend this kind of money on 
a frivolous case."). Indeed, empirical data does not support the contention that NPEs 
initiate frivolous lawsuits. In a study analyzing the activity of 51 NPEs, Shrestha 
found that NPE initiated infringement suits were slightly more likely to be successful 
than those initiated by other plaintiffs. Shrestha, supra note 2, at 148. Moreov~r, an 
empirical study of the 50 most litigated patents, by Lemley et al., determined that "the 
characteristics that distinguish the most-litigated patents from other patents are also 
the ones that researchers have long used to identify the most-valuable patents .... A 
reasonable conclusion, therefore, is that the most-litigated patents are also the most-
valuable patents." Allison, supra note 10, at 28. They also found that the vast majority 
of these patents were held by NPEs. Id. 
THE NON-PLANTING ENTITY AND THE APPLE TREE 425 
force weak patents and file frivolous claims, by exposing this strategy 
as irrational and ineffective. These arguments must be seriously con-
sidered before any further legal or judicial changes are made in an 
effort to thwart NPEs, especially if these decisions would weaken the 
protection afforded to patent owners. A misstep could have serious 
economic consequences. 
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